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THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN UNDER
MISSOURI'S URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
CORPORATIONS LAW'
I. INTRODUCTION
Eminent domain is the power to appropriate private property for the
public benefit.2 The inherent power of the government3 to take prop-
erty against the will of the owner' is subject to constitutional5 and stat-
utory limitations.6 Specifically, the United States and Missouri
constitutions limit governmental takings to those that serve a public
use.7 Furthermore, the Urban Redevelopment Corporations Law
(Chapter 353), a Missouri statute, authorizes takings only for the pur-
pose of redeveloping blighted areas.'
Missouri public policy favors redevelopment by private enterprise. 9
A municipality can employ eminent domain to assemble individually
owned, underdeveloped properties as sites for private economic devel-
1. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 353.010-353.180 (1986 & Supp. 1988). The statute was
originally enacted in 1943 and is popularly known as Chapter 353.
2. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, pp. 523-24
(1868).
3. 1 NICHOLs, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 1.14(2) (J. Sackman rev. 3rd ed.
1980).
4. Id. at § 1.11.
5. U.S. CONST. amend V; Mo. CONST. art I, § 26.
6. Chapter 353 requires that the property be blighted to justify its taking pursuant
to a redevelopment plan. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 353.020 (Supp. 1988), 353.030(12)
(1986).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 26.
8. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 353.010-353.180 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
9. Mo. REV. STAT. § 99.310 (1986). Sections 99.300-99.660 are known as the Land
Clearance for Redevelopment Law.
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opment.10 Pursuant to Chapter 353, Missouri cities can empower de-
velopers to acquire lands by condemnation,11 allowing private
developers to plan and perform the redevelopment. Redevelopment in
Missouri is largely accomplished through this cooperation between
government and private enterprise. 12
Through its power of eminent domain, the city encourages redevel-
opment by enabling developers to: (1) acquire a project site quickly,
(2) purchase the properties in the project area at fair market prices
instead of prices inflated by speculation, and (3) assemble large enough
parcels to accommodate the redevelopment projects within the city. 3
While quantifying the extent to which Chapter 353 redevelopment cor-
porations have actually taken property by eminent domain, its poten-
tial use has facilitated the assembly of numerous properties that could
not otherwise have been acquired.' 4
This Note will review the effect of eminent domain on economic re-
development in Missouri under Chapter 353. Part II discusses the con-
stitutional and statutory limitations on the exercise of eminent domain
under Chapter 353. Part III concerns the local government's role and
the scope of judicial review of this role. Part IV reviews the relevant
case law and specific Chapter 353 projects. Part V examines contem-
porary controversies which raise difficult questions of blight and public
use.
10. For example, the City of Detroit condemned an entire neighborhood to create
space for General Motors to build a new manufacturing plant in the area. General
Motors got a desirable plant site at low cost when it would have been nearly impossible
for GM to assemble such a site in Detroit on the open market. Additionally, Detroit
saved jobs and tax revenues. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,
410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
11. Annbar Associates v. West Side Redevelopment Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635, 639
(Mo. 1965).
12. Id.
13. City Development Department, Kansas City, Missouri, STATUS REPORT: 353
PROJECTS IN KANSAS CrrY, MISSOURI, 1986-1987, (1987).
14. D. MANDELKER, G. FEDER & M. COLLINS, REVIVING CITIES WITH TAX
ABATEMENTS 81 (1980).
St. Louis and Kansas City routinely grant Chapter 353 redevelopment corporations
the power of eminent domain, but their 353 agencies do not have detailed records of its
actual use. Interview with JoAnne McGinnis, Community Development Planner,
Community Development Agency, St. Louis, Missouri (February 13, 1989); Interview
with John Langa, Project Manager, Ochsner, Hare & Hare, Planning Consultants, Kan-
sas City, Missouri (February 13, 1989).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
A. The Public Use Requirement
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 26 of the Missouri constitution both provide that private prop-
erty shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation.'5
Both constitutions require that the condemnation of private property
serve a public use and that the condemnee receive just compensation.' 6
The just compensation requirement is explicit. 7 The public use re-
quirement is created by negative inference, implying that takings solely
for private use are impermissible regardless of compensation. I s Ana-
lyzing the phrase "public use" is problematic because the courts have
not articulated a comprehensive and universally accepted definition.19
Historically the courts narrowly construed the public use requirement.
They held that unless the public had the right to actual occupation or
use of the property after condemnation, the use was impermissibly pri-
vate.20 Hence, a prototypical condemnation for public use is the taking
of rights of way for public roads.2'
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV applies
this constraint to the states' exercise of eminent domain.
Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 26, provides that "private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation."
16. See generally Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Do-
main, 20 B.U.L. REV. 615 (1940).
17. Determining just compensation is a thorny issue worthy of extensive analyses
and beyond the scope of this Note. Generally, condemnees are entitled to fair market
value of their property. However, under current Missouri law, condemnees may suffer
losses due to market price depreciation during the period between the declaration that
the property is blighted (and thus subject to redevelopment under Chapter 353) and the
date of condemnation. See Note, Condemnation Blight: Compensating the Landowner
in Missouri, 48 Mo. L. REV. 220 (1983). See also State ex rel. Washington University
Medical Center Redevelopment Corp. v. Gaertner, 626 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Mo. 1982);
Moore v. Thiemann-Stinnett Corp., 692 S.W.2d 841, 842 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (there is
no provision under Missouri condemnation law for compensating landowners for the
decline in value between the date the property is declared blighted and the date of the de
jure taking, but condemnees may have a tort action for damages caused by unreasonable
delay between blighting and de jure taking).
18. Nichols, supra note 16, at 616.
19. 1 NICHOLS, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 7.02 (Supp. 1989).
20. Bennett, Eminent Domain and Redevelopment: The Return of Engine Charlie,
31 DE PAUL L. REV. 115, 116, (1981).
21. Id. In the late nineteenth century eminent domain was used to facilitate the
railroad boom. Id. at 119. The courts found the public benefits derived from speedy
1990]
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Today, however, most courts broadly construe "public use" to en-
compass economic redevelopment.22 Since the early 1900's the
Supreme Court has rejected the notion that "public use" meant actual
continuing use and occupation by the public.23 In Berman v. Parker24
the Court found that a taking for slum clearance satisfied the public use
requirement even though the property eventually would be resold to
private enterprise.25 The Court held that the transfer of property from
one private party to another satisfied the public use requirement so
long as some public purpose was served.26
B. The Statutory Scheme Under Chapter 353
Only "blighted" property is subject to condemnation under Chapter
353.27 The statute defines a "blighted area" as:
that portion of the city within which the legislative authority of
transportation of persons and goods justified the exercise of eminent domain. Id. at
119-20. By the beginning of the twentieth century most courts approved the use of
eminent domain to assemble sites for power and utility companies because these enter-
prises were essential to increasing the productive power of the community. Id. at 121.
22. See, e.g., Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171,
339 A.2d 278, 289 (1975) (projects reasonably designed to benefit the general public by
enhancing economic growth are public uses, at least where the exercise of the power of
condemnation provides an impetus which private enterprise cannot provide). See also
Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1980) (condemnation of property for
city center project served legitimate public purpose despite claim that project's approval
was motivated by private interests); Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York
Authority, 12 N.Y.2d 379, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, 190 N.E.2d 402 (1963) (use of property to
produce revenue to help finance activities for development of a world trade center was
use for a public purpose).
Many courts will not permit condemnation of unblighted property for private eco-
nomic development. Bennett, supra note 20 at 123.25. See Edens v. City of Columbia,
228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956) (refused to construe public use so broadly as to
encompass economic redevelopment); City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3
(Ky. 1979) (required actual use by the public). But see Poletown Neighborhood Council,
410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (upheld the condemnation of an entire neigh-
borhood that was not substandard to create space for a General Motors plant).
23. Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240
U.S. 30 (1916) (repudiated the use-by-the-public test).
24. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
25. Id. at 28-36.
26. Id. at 33-34. See also Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
(1984) (upheld the use of eminent domain to effect transfers among private parties for
the purpose of eliminating a land oligopoly).
27. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.020(8) (Supp.1988) defines "redevelopment" as the
"clearance, replanning, reconstruction or rehabilitation of any blighted area. .. "
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such city determines that by reason of age, obsolescence, inade-
quate or outmoded design or physical deterioration, have become
[sic] economic and social liabilities, and that such conditions are
conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, crime or inability
to pay reasonable taxes.2"
A 1982 amendment obligates the city to hold a public hearing, provid-
ing citizens an opportunity to comment on the proposed grant of pow-
ers to a redevelopment corporation.29  Following the hearing, the
legislature determines whether the property considered for redevelop-
ment is in fact a blighted area.a° The city can only grant powers to a
redevelopment corporation pursuant to a development plan after the
legislature declares the area blighted.3 1
Redevelopers must form a limited profit urban redevelopment corpo-
ration32 and submit a development plan to the responsible city
agency.3 3 After a city declares an area blighted and approves a devel-
opment plan, it may take the property by eminent domain and transfer
it to a redevelopment corporation. 4 Alternatively, the city can author-
28. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(2) (Supp. 1988).
29. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.060 (as amended by L.1982, P. 308, § 1).
30. Id. The city ordinances that formally codify these determinations are popularly
known as "blighting ordinances."
Individual properties within a blighted area do not necessarily have to be indepen-
dently blighted if condemnation of such properties is necessary for the purposes of a
redevelopment project pursuant to the act. See Parking Systems, Inc. v. Kansas City
Downtown Redev. Corp., 518 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1974). See also Annotation, What
Constitutes "Blighted Area" Within Urban Renewal and Redevelopment Statutes, 45
A.L.R.3d 1096, 1110-1114 (1972).
31. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.060 (1986). Chapter 353 defines "development plan" as
"a plan, together with any amendments thereto, for the development of all or any part
of a blighted area, which is authorized by the legislative authority of any such city."
Mo. BEV. STAT. § 353.020(4) (Supp. 1988) CHAPTER 353 DEFINES "DEVELOPMENT
PLAN" AS "A PLAN, TOGETHER WITH ANY AMENDMENTS THERETO, FOR THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF ALL OR ANY PART OF A BLIGHTED AREA, WHICH IS AUTHORIZED BY THE
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OF ANY SUCH CITY." Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(4) (Supp.
1988).
32. An "urban redevelopment corporation" is a corporation organized under the
provisions of Chapter 353, with certain exceptions for Missouri life insurance compa-
nies. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(10) (Supp. 1988). Section 353.030(11) limits the net
earnings of an urban redevelopment corporation to 8% per annum of the cost of the
redevelopment project including the cost of land. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.030(11)
(1986).
33. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(4) (Supp. 1988). See supra notes 29-30 and accom-
panying text (discusses procedure for a development plan's approval).
34. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.170 (1986).
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ize the redevelopment corporation to exercise the power of eminent
domain pursuant to the approved development plan.35
The statute provides for a tax abatement on property subject to the
development plan as a further incentive for redevelopment.36 How-
ever, the city may contract for payments in lieu of taxes. 37 The tax
benefits, while central to Chapter 353's redevelopment incentive
scheme, are tangential to the eminent domain issues. 31
III. THE CITY'S ROLE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. The City's Role
The Missouri statute empowers cities39 to implement and administer
35. Id. § 353.130(2) (1986). Cities prefer to authorize the redevelopment corpora-
tion to exercise eminent domain so that the redevelopment corporation and not the city
is responsible for managing condemnation proceedings. Interview with JoAnne Mc-
Ginnis, Community Development Planner, Community Development Agency, St.
Louis, Missouri (February 13, 1989).
36. Mo. Rlv. STAT. § 353.110 (1986) states:
the property shall not be subject to general ad valorem taxes for up to ten years
except to such extent and in such amount as may be imposed... measured solely
by the amount of assessed valuation of the land, exclusive of improvements...
during the calendar year preceding the calendar year during which the corporation
acquired title to such real property; for up to 15 more years, the property will be
taxed at fifty percent of its real value.
37. Id. § 353.110(4). St. Louis' policy is to require the redevelopment corporation
during the first ten years of ownership to make payments in lieu of tax equivalent to the
ad valorem tax paid on property improvements during the calendar year prior to the
calendar year of purchase. This results in the city losing no property taxes as a result of
the redevelopment proposal. See Chapter 353 Development Incentive Program, Devel-
oper's Information (available from the Community Development Agency, City of St.
Louis).
38. According to Mark Hill, of the Kansas City Plan Commission, and John Langa,
a Kansas City consultant involved in a study of the use of Chapter 353 in Kansas City
on behalf of a developer, the tax abatement feature is the more controversial issue in
Kansas City. Interview with Mark Hill, Planner, City Development Department, Kan-
sas City, Missouri (February 14, 1989); interview with John Langa, Project Manager,
Ochsner, Hare & Hare, Planning Consultants, Kansas City, Missouri (February 13,
1989).
The St. Louis Community Development Agency is presently reevaluating its tax
abatements to determine whether this use is excessive. Interview with David Laslow,
Community Development Planner, Community Development Agency, St. Louis, Mis-
souri (February 13, 1989). See generally MANDELKER, supra note 14.
39. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(3) makes Chapter 353 available to constitutional
charter cities; cities with a population of four thousand or more, according to the pre-
ceding decennial census, which are located in counties with a charter form of govern-
ment; and cities with a population of two thousand five hundred or more, according to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/5
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Chapter 353 development plans." A recent survey showed that at
least thirteen Missouri cities have used Chapter 353, with St. Louis,
University City (a St. Louis suburb) and Kansas City accounting for
about eighty-five percent of the state's Chapter 353 redevelopment
projects.4 The city's role involves identifying the blighted areas in
need of redevelopment,42 reviewing and approving development pro-
posals43 and granting Chapter 353 rights and powers to redevelopment
corporations.
The city may have a general procedural ordinance further regulating
Chapter 353 projects.' Under such ordinances, development plans
generally must include statements regarding:
(1) descriptions of the proposed project,
(2) the stages of the development and time limits for the construc-
tion of each stage,
(3) plans for each existing structure and proposed new structures,
(4) property to be purchased or taken by condemnation,
(5) proposed financing and
(6) proposed zoning changes.45
The Kansas City procedural ordinance additionally requires that devel-
opment plans include studies showing that the area is in fact blighted.46
Such procedural ordinances may also require the redevelopment corpo-
ration to assist in the relocation of displaced occupants.47
The St. Louis procedural ordinance requires that every ordinance
the preceding decennial census, which are located in counties without a charter form of
government.
40. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 353.010, 353.020(4).
41. Interview with John Langa, Project Manager, Ochsner, Hare & Hare, Planning
Consultants, Kansas City, Missouri (February 13, 1989).
42. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(2).
43. Id. § 353.020(4).
44. The Urban Redevelopment Ordinance, Chapter 36, Revised Ordinances of Kan-
sas City and City of St. Louis Ordinance No. 49583 (as amended), are exemplary.
45. City of St. Louis Ordinance No. 49583, § 5; The Urban Redevelopment Ordi-
nance, Chapter 36, § 36.7, Revised Ordinances of Kansas City.
46. Section 36.5.1, Revised Ordinances of Kansas City.
47. City of St. Louis Ordinance No. 49583, §§ 5(m) and 13(e); and § 36.7.1, Revised
Ordinances of Kansas City.
Kansas City's relocation requirements are codified in § 36.7.8. They require notice
and payment of relocation benefits to displaced occupants in advance of the date they
must vacate. The city must provide residential occupants with $500 or actual reason-
able moving expenses. Handicapped occupants are entitled to an amount, not to exceed
$400. This amount equals the cost of adapting replacement dwellings to the occupant's
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
176 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 37:169
approving a development plan shall contain a finding that the plan is in
the public interest, a penalty provision for failure of a redevelopment
corporation to complete a project in timely fashion, and a provision
limiting use of the property to that use described in the development
plan.48 To ensure compliance with development plans the ordinance
also requires the city to contract with the redevelopment corporation.49
B. Judicial Review
Despite the constitutional and statutory limitations on the use of em-
inent domain, challenging a city blighting or redevelopment ordinance
is difficult because of limited judicial review.50 The courts may not
substitute their judgment for the city's, 5 and may strike a city's deter-
standards for accessibility and usability. Commercial occupants are entitled to $1500 or
actual reasonable moving expenses.
St. Louis requires private developers who invoke the power of eminent domain to
provide relocation assistance with regard to any permanent displacement project which
is not subject to the Federal Uniform Relocation and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act. Residential occupants are entitled to $350 in moving expenses and commercial
occupants are entitled to $500 moving expenses. If the actual reasonable expenses are
more, however, the developer and the occupant shall negotiate a mutually acceptable
moving allowance. Relocation payments must be made no later than one week after the
occupant vacates. See Direct Displacement: City of St. Louis Relocation Policy
(6/19/86), available from the Community Development Agency, City of St. Louis (en-
closed in "Developer's Information").
48. City of St. Louis Ordinance No. 49583, § 13.
49. City of St. Louis Ordinance No. 49583, § 14. See also Chapter 353: Develop-
ment Incentive Program, Developer's Information, p. 2, available from the Community
Development Agency, City of St. Louis (upon enactment into law of an ordinance ap-
proving a development plan, the city enters into a contract with the urban redevelop-
ment corporation for a codification of their proposals. This contract includes time
limits, descriptions of the proposals and other items such as relocation procedure and
delineation of public improvements to be correlated with the development plan).
50. In 1954 the Supreme Court of Missouri held:
final determination of the question whether the contemplated use of any property
sought to be taken under the Law here in question is public rests upon the courts,
but that a legislative finding under said law that a blighted or insanitary area exists
and that the legislative agency proposes to take the property therein under the
processes of eminent domain for the purpose of clearance and improvement and
subsequent sale upon such terms and restrictions as it may deem in the public
interest will be accepted by the courts as conclusive evidence that the contemplated
use thereof is public, unless it further appears upon allegation and clear proof that
the legislative finding was arbitrary or induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith.
See Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of Kansas City, Mo. 364
Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44, 52 (Mo. 1954).
51. Parking Systems, Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment Corporation,
518 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 1974).
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mination only if it is arbitrary or induced by fraud, collusion or bad
faith. 2 Missouri courts have consistently held that in determining
whether an area is blighted, the city acts in its legislative capacity, and
therefore judicial review of such legislative determinations should be
limited.53
The Missouri Supreme Court, in Dalton v. Land Clearance for Rede-
velopment Authority of Kansas City, adhered to limited judicial review
when considering a public use question despite a conflicting constitu-
tional provision. 4 Article I, section 28 of the Missouri Constitution
demands that "when an attempt is made to take private property for a
use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be
public shall be judicially determined without regard to any legislative
declaration that the use is public."55 Article I, section 28, is somewhat
at odds with article VI, section 26 of the 1945 Missouri Constitution,
which expressly sanctioned the legislative enactment of eminent do-
main laws to facilitate redevelopment of blighted areas.56 Relying on
article VI, section 26, the Missouri Supreme Court held that courts
should regard a city's determination that a taking for purposes of rede-
velopment satisfies the public use requirement, unless it is arbitrary or
induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith.57
Missouri courts constre "public use" liberally. 8 Thus, even if the
courts were inclined to scrutinize city public use determinations, Mis-
souri law requires only that the taking produce a public benefit. 9
IV. CHAPTER 353 REDEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
A. Relevant Case Law
1. The Constitutionality of Chapter 353 Takings
Annbar Associates v. West Side Redevelopment Corp.'° concerned a
52. Id. at 15 (judicial review is limited to whether the legislative determination was
arbitrary or was induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith); see also Allright Missouri v.
Civic Plaza Redevelopment Corp., 538 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. 1976).
53. Id.
54. See supra note 50.
55. Mo. CONSr. art. I, sec. 28 (emphasis added).
56. Mo. CONsr. art. VI, § 21.
57. Dalton, 270 S.W.2d at 53.
58. Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 409 (Mo. 1923).
59. Id.
60. 397 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1965).
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constitutional challenge to Chapter 353 and a development plan trans-
forming Kansas City's Quality Hill area into a convention center and
hotel district.61 The plaintiffs conceded that the area was blighted,
62
but they contended that Chapter 353 and the Kansas City ordinances
authorized unconstitutional takings for private use.63
Following Dalton," the court held that the judiciary must defer to
the legislative public use determination unless it is arbitrary or induced
by fraud, collusion or bad faith.65 Given this deferential standard of
review, the court summarily upheld the constitutionality of Chapter
353 and the Kansas City ordinances.66
2. Defining Public Use
Schweig v. Maryland Plaza Redevelopment Corp. 67 emphasized that
the public use requirement is satisfied solely by the redevelopment of
blighted areas, regardless of the benefits accruing from the use of the
area after redevelopment. 6  Although the use of the residential and
commercial buildings subject to the plan would not have changed after
redevelopment, the Schweig court found that extensive interior re-
61. Id. at 638. Interestingly, the primary challengers were the owners of two nearby
hotels which would compete with the proposed hotels. The third challenger intervened
over the others' objections, and was the only challenger to own property within the
blighted area. Id.
62. Id. at 641.
63. Id. at 637-38. Two Kansas City ordinances were challenged: the General Rede-
velopment Procedural Ordinance (Chapter 61, Revised Ordinances of Kansas City),
and the particular redevelopment ordinance which blighted the area and authorized the
development plan (Substitute Ordinance No. 29352, R.O.K.C.).
64. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of Kansas City, 270
S.W.2d 44 (1954). See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
65. 397 S.W.2d at 645-46.
66. Id. at 648.
67. 676 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App. 1984). This case is actually the third in a series
involving the Maryland Plaza redevelopment project. In Schweig v. City of St. Louis,
569 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. App. 1978), the court held that persons owning property near the
redevelopment area had standing to challenge the plan because of the adverse affect on
the value of their property when a redevelopment project is abandoned before comple-
tion. In Maryland Plaza Redevelopment Corporation v. Greenberg, 594 S.W.2d 284
(Mo. App. 1979), the court upheld the determination that the Maryland Plaza area was
blighted, but struck the ordinance approving the development plan. See infra Part
IV(A)(4).
68. Schweig, 676 S.W.2d at 253. The court stated that "it is not the end use to
which these buildings are put that determines whether the taking is for public use, but
whether the taking aids the redevelopment of a blighted area." Id.
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novation of buildings in a blighted area satisfied the public use
requirement.69
Courts widely uphold redevelopment statutes on the ground that
clearance and redevelopment of blighted areas serve a public pur-
pose.70 This rationale makes the finding of blight essential to satisfy
both the constitution and statutory requirements of takings for
redevelopment.71
3. Deference to the City Regarding Blight
In Allright Missouri, Inc. v. Civic Plaza Redevelopment Corp. 72 own-
ers and lessees of property within the area to be redeveloped argued
that approval of the development plan violated Chapter 353 because
the area was not blighted.73 The challengers prevailed in the lower
courts, which found that the city's determination of blight was arbi-
trary.74 In reversing the lower courts, 75 the supreme court emphasized
that the city had studied the project extensively and had held public
hearings.76 Consequently, the court held that there was enough room
for reasonable debate that the city could determine that the area was
blighted.77 This decision illustrates the deference Missouri courts give
to city legislative determinations of blight.
4. Court Scrutiny of Development Plans
City procedural ordinances set forth specific content requirements
for development plans.78 In Maryland Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v.
69. Id. at 253-54. The extensive interior renovation included redecoration and up-
grading of electrical, plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating equipment. Id.
70. Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statutes Providing for Urban
Redevelopment by Private Enterprise, 44 A.L.R.2d 1414, at 1420 (1955). See also Dal-
ton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of Kansas, 364 Mo. 974, 270
S.W.2d 44 (1954).
71. The determination of blight is not merely a statutory requirement, since it is
essential to finding a public use. Thus, if a determination of blight is arbitrary, or in-
duced by fraud, collusion of bad faith, the ordinance violates the constitution as well as
Chapter 353.
72. 538 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. 1976).
73. Id. at 321-22.
74. Id. at 324.
75. Id. at 324.
76. Id. at 322-3.
77. Id. at 324.
78. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text of Part HI(A).
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Greenberg79 the court invalidated a development ordinance8° for fail-
ure of the plan to provide a detailed statement of financing as required
by the city's procedural ordinance.8 While denying that it was substi-
tuting its judgment for that of the city's, the court found the plan did
not include a sufficiently detailed financial statement.82 However, the
plan did state that "debt financing [would] be on a structure-to-struc-
ture basis" and that "the cost of public areas [would] be provided for
all structures by the developer."83 The court held that such statements
were too vague to be considered even rudimental, much less detailed.84
State ex rel. Devanssay v. McGuire85 upheld a similar development
ordinance. The court explained that a development plan must contain
a description of the redeveloper's proposed method to obtain money for
the redevelopment. However, the plan need not delineate the precise
sources of financing.86 The description must be sufficiently detailed to
afford the city a basis for determining its feasibility.87 The plan at issue
merely listed various specific methods of prospective financing for each
of the various aspects of the projects.88 The court also considered the
discussions at the public hearings.89 The hearings revealed that two
banks had orally committed to financing the keystone building. One of
the banks had orally committed to additional financing if the first
building was successful. Another bank was interested in financing re-
development in the project area. The hearings also revealed that affili-
ates of the redevelopment corporation had assets of approximately $50
million.90
79. 594 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. App. 1979).
80. City of St. Louis Ordinance No. 56933. The ordinance which approves a devel-
opment plan and confers the taking power upon a redevelopment corporation is some-
times called a development ordinance. See Maryland Plaza Redevelopment Corp., 594
S.W.2d at 285.
81. Maryland Plaza Redevelopment Corp., 594 S.W.2d at 291.
82. Id. at 290. The court felt the scope of review was limited to whether approval of
the plan was arbitrary. If the statement had been arguably sufficient, the court would
have deferred to the city's determination. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 622 S.W.2d 323 (Mo. App. 1981).
86. Id. at 327.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. 327-28.
90. Id. at 328.
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B. The Act in Practice
1. St. Louis
In St. Louis, Chapter 353 has been a powerful counterbalance to the
property tax and private market forces which tend to discourage rede-
velopment in the city.91 Almost all major downtown and neighbor-
hood redevelopment projects have been accomplished under Chapter
353.92 By 1985, 1.5 billion dollars had been invested in St. Louis via
Chapter 353 redevelopment projects. 93 Furthermore, the approval rate
of development plans increased dramatically in the 1980s. Between
1960 and 1980 the city approved thirty-one development plans. At
least twice that many have been approved since 1981."
One of the earliest and largest Chapter 353 projects involved the re-
development of the Civic Center area.95 The redevelopment included
the construction of Busch Stadium, parking garages, the Clarion and
Marriott Hotels, Pet, Inc. headquarters building, Equitable Building,
General American Headquarters, Centerre Bank, Mark Twain Bank,
the 1010 Market Building and the Bowling Hall of Fame.96 As of
April 1986 investment in the area totaled over $364 million.9 7
Another major St. Louis Chapter 353 redevelopment area is St.
Louis Centre.98 Investment in the seven phase plan has totaled over
$238 million.99 New construction included the Mercantile Tower, St.
Louis Centre retail mall, the St. Louis Centre Tower, the Edison
Brothers Building and parking garages."x Other buildings were reha-
bilitated including the Railway Exchange Building and Stix, Baer &
Fuller (now Dillards). 101
The Laclede's Landing redevelopment involved the rehabilitation of
91. MANDELKER, supra note 14, at 27.
92. Id.
93. Chapter 353 Status Report, p. 1, Community Development Agency, City of St.
Louis, Missouri (April 1986).
94. Id. and Community Development Agency's record of approved plans (revised
July 20, 1988).
95. Chapter 353 Status Report, p. 56, Community Development Agency, City of St.
Louis, Missouri (April 1986).
96. Id. at 56-60.
97. Id. at 56.
98. Id. at 130.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 130-33.
101. Id.
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a historically significant warehouse district and its conversion to en-
tertainment, retail and office uses." 2 More recently, $105 million was
invested in the Adams Mark, a first class hotel facility which lies just
west of the Arch.1
0 3
2. Kansas City
Kansas City has been as successful as St. Louis in implementing
Chapter 353. More than forty-two projects representing over two bil-
lion dollars in private investment have been approved in Kansas
City."° The nationally known Crown Center project best illustrates
the success of Kansas City's 353 Program. 10 5 The project alone has
created 2,113,800 square feet of office space, 497,000 square feet of
commercial space, 1,462 hotel rooms, 2,063 residential units and 9,753
parking spaces.10 6
The Pershing Square project created 2,500,000 square feet of office
space, 587,000 square feet of commercial space, 950 hotel rooms, 1,495
residential units and 6,320 parking spaces. 7 Through Chapter 353,
Kansas City also redeveloped many smaller scale projects.10 8
V. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
Chapter 353 redevelopment projects have literally changed the faces
of St. Louis and Kansas City. The success of the statute depends on
the extent to which it encourages the desired entrepreneurial response,
rather than merely subsidizing development which would have oc-
curred anyway." 9 While studies show that Chapter 353 developers
consider the Chapter 353 redevelopment incentives important, no one
102. MANDELKER, supra note 14, at 28.
103. Id. at 27.
104. Status Report: 353 Projects in Kansas City, Missouri 1986-1987, inside front
cover, City Development Department, Kansas City, Missouri (August 1987).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 7.
107. Id.
108. Id. The brevity of the current Kansas City Chapter 353 Status Report creates
difficulty in obtaining detailed information on any of the city's projects. However, the
City Development Department will soon publish an updated expanded status report.
Interview with Mark Hill, Planner, City Development Department, City of Kansas
City, Missouri (February 14, 1989).
109. MANDELKER, supra note 14, at 21.
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has proven their actual effectiveness.11°
At the time of this writing two controversies were brewing in the St.
Louis area regarding the proposed use of eminent domain under Chap-
ter 353. Both of these controversies pose difficult questions of blight
and public use.
A. The Galleria in Richmond Heights
Richmond Heights, a suburban municipality in St. Louis County,
hosts a large, modem shopping mall known as the Galleria. It includes
one anchor department store; many, mostly upscale, smaller retail
stores; a theatre; a food court and a few restaurants. The developers
foresee expanding the mall into a quiet neighborhood of well-kept
homes that lies just to the south of the mall.
The city declared the area blighted on March 15, 1982.11' Alleg-
edly, the city expected to approve a development plan proposed by the
Thiemann-Stinnett Corporation. 12 The developer planned to expand
the mall into the neighborhood through the power of eminent domain
under Chapter 353.1"' But the development plan was never approved,
no power of eminent domain was ever granted and the blighting
designation was later rescinded. 14
Recently the Richmond Heights City Council enacted a Chapter 353
procedural ordinance. 15 The ordinance merely provides the proce-
dures for declaring an area blighted under Chapter 353 standards. 16
Reports indicate that the ordinance was supported by the developer
currently interested in a 337 million dollar expansion of the Gal-
leria. 17 The city, however, steadfastly denies any specific plan to use
the ordinance to expand the mall into neighborhood property." 8 Ulti-
mately, the promoters of the expansion of the Galleria reached a pri-
vate settlement with the home owners in the neighborhood." 9 The
110. Id. at 34-37.
111. Moore v. Thiemann-Stinnett Corp., 692 S.W.2d 841, 842 (Mo. App. 1985).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at footnote 1.
115. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 7, 1989, at 6A, col. 5.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Interview with Carl Schwing, City Administrator, City of Richmond Heights
(February 13, 1989).
119. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 29, 1989, at 1A, col. 1.
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homes were being razed as this article went to print. 2 ' While Chapter
353 powers were not actually exercised, the well-publicized threat of
their use probably contributed to the private settlement.1 2 1
This scenario raises difficult eminent domain issues. Chapter 353 de-
clares an area blighted when it has become an economic and social
liability because of its advanced age, obsolescence, inadequate or out-
moded design or physical deterioration. The statute is designed to ob-
literate environments that are not conducive to health and breed
disease or crime. 122 The neighborhood targeted for the Galleria expan-
sion consisted of well-kept, middle class homes. The area clearly falls
outside of Chapter 353's definition of blight, and thus, its taking would
be statutorily invalid.
The expansion of the Galleria will likely benefit the City of Rich-
mond Heights by substantially increasing tax revenues. Therefore,
while the area does not meet the statutory requirement of blight, its
taking might nevertheless satisfy the constitutional public use require-
ment. 12 3 As discussed in Part II, Missouri courts construe the public
use requirement very liberally. Conceivably, they could find that the
economic development of the magnitude proposed here satisfies the
public use requirement irrespective of the nonblighted condition of the
property to be taken.
Because of the limited judicial scrutiny of city determinations of
blight, city politicians tend to take a very liberal view of the statutory
blight requirement. In fact, the Kansas City 353 Program Status Re-
port boasts to developers that the blight definition is "flexible."' 24
B. The Columbia Building
The Columbia Building was erected in the late nineteenth century.
Although it once stood nine stories tall, in 1976 the owner razed seven
stories due to deterioration.' 2 5 Today it is a humble two stories, but is
120. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 5, 1989, at IA, col 2.
121. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
122. Mo. REv. STAT., § 353.020(2) (Supp. 1988).
123. It is possible that the city could go beyond Chapter 353 to effect this develop-
ment. The city could take the property itself and transfer it to the private interests for
development. This would be similar to the situation in Poletown Neighborhood Council;
see supra notes 26, 25, and 10. Chapter 353 would be inapplicable.
124. Status Report: 353 Projects in Kansas City, Missouri 1986-1987, inside back
cover, City Development Department, Kansas City, Missouri (August 1987).
125. The Riverfront Times, Dec. 7, 1988, at 10.
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fully occupied.126
The Columbia is located next to a growing St. Louis law firm seeking
to expand into the Columbia.'2 7 After the owner of the Columbia
rebuffed its overtures, the law firm went to the city.' 2 8 In June of 1988,
the Community Development Agency recommended that the Board of
Aldermen approve the law firm's Chapter 353 development plan for
the Columbia.' 29 The law firm proposes to expand its offices into the
Columbia Building, construct three new stories and adjoin it to the
firm's present offices. 130 Because the owner would like to keep the Co-
lumbia, the law firm needs the power of eminent domain to take it
pursuant to the development plan.
This scenario raises issues different from the proposed Galleria ex-
pansion. One of the most important events that significantly increased
the use of, and controversy surrounding, Chapter 353 was the success-
ful aldermanic effort to blight all of downtown St. Louis for Chapter
353 purposes.13 ' On June 29, 1971 the City of St. Louis, by Ordinance
No. 55952, declared that all of downtown was blighted and ripe for
Chapter 353 redevelopment.' 3 2
As a result of that declaration, the Columbia lies within an area al-
ready determined to be blighted. Thus, when the Community Devel-
opment Agency reviewed the law firm's development proposal and
recommended its approval by the Board, it was not required to con-
sider the question of blight. 133 It only had to determine whether the
proposed development of the Columbia was consistent with the city's
general plan for downtown redevelopment.' 3 1
While this approach is consistent with the letter of Chapter 353, it
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Interview with JoAnne McGinnis, Community Development Planner, Com-
munity Development Agency, City of St. Louis, Missouri (February 13, 1989).
130. The Riverfront Times, supra note 125, at 10.
131. MANDELKER, supra note 14, at 74.
132. Community Development Agency's record of approved plans, p.2-3 (revised
July 20, 1988).
Kansas City also has a similarly broad downtown blighting ordinance. Interview
with Mark Hill, Planner, City Development Department, City of Kansas City, Missouri
(February 14, 1989).
133. Interview with JoAnne McGinnis, Community Development Planner, Com-
munity Development Agency, City of St. Louis, Missouri (February 13, 1989).
134. Id.
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may not be consistent with its spirit. The Columbia does not have to
be blighted if its taking is necessary to effect the redevelopment of a
larger area, 135 but that situation is not present in the current contro-
versy. Here the proposed redevelopment involves the Columbia exclu-
sively. It seems somewhat of a farce to justify the taking of the
Columbia as necessary to the redevelopment of all of downtown with-
out an independent determination that the Columbia is in fact blighted
itself. This is particularly true when one considers the radical improve-
ment in the condition of downtown St. Louis, since the downtown
blighting ordinance was enacted seventeen years ago.
On the other hand, the typical downtown development ordinance
includes a reaffirmation that the redevelopment project lies within a
blighted area. These provisions probably involve no more than a rub-
ber stamping of past declarations of blight. Furthermore, they clearly
place another hurdle in the way of one challenging a Chapter 353 tak-
ing. If such a provision were shown to be without an analytical basis in
the record, the challenger will have proven its arbitrariness.
Development plans such as the one for the Columbia should be
based upon independent determinations that the area of proposed de-
velopment is in fact blighted. Moreover, sometimes it is necessary, and
proper, to include unblighted property within a larger blighted area to
effect the redevelopment of such larger blighted area. But declaring
areas as large as downtown St. Louis or Kansas City blighted in one
fell swoop, defeats the purpose of the statutory requirement that the
area for redevelopment be blighted.
VI. CONCLUSION
The exercise of eminent domain is always controversial. The con-
troversey is particularly intense under Chapter 353 because property is
simply transferred from one private owner to another. Generally local
governments take seriously their responsibility to approve only projects
which will produce significant public benefits. Once significant public
benefits are identified, however, local governments tend to minimize
their statutory responsibility to ensure that only property in blighted
areas is taken from its owners. Thus, a judicial check is appropriate.
135. Mo. REv. STAT. § 353.020(1) (Supp. 1988).
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Nevertheless, Missouri courts do little more than rubber stamp legisla-
tive determinations of blight and public use.
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